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From Opportunity to Right: 
Constitutional Change and the 
Establishment Clause 
Cameron A. VanSant* 
From such State rights, good Lord deliver us! I utterly repudiate 
them from the creed of my political faith! 
–Georgia Supreme Court Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin, 18521 
INTRODUCTION 
In Living Originalism, Jack Balkin encourages us to consider the 
Constitution as a ―framework,‖ a solid base upon which generations of 
Americans build up and out to create a structure whose façade the Framers 
might hardly recognize, but whose foundation should always remain 
familiar.2 Sometimes—as during the New Deal—entire floors of the 
                                                          
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2013; Duke University, A.B. 2009. The author would like to 
thank Professor Jack Balkin for supervising the paper that became this Note and Shouvik Bhattacharya 
and the other Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities editors for their expert editing. 
 1. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 367 (1852) (discussing whether states may rightfully violate the 
individual liberties expressed in the Federal Bill of Rights). 
2. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 20-21 (2011) (―Later generations have a lot to do to 
1
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building are renovated overnight.3 Other parts take decades to create; 
Americans of one era think they can envision the finished structure, yet 
their successors tear it down or build in another direction, public opinion 
having shifted to favor a different plan altogether.4 
An important example of the latter mode of construction involves the 
issue of government-imposed religious establishments. As several scholars 
have suggested, Americans‘ interpretation of the First Amendment‘s 
Establishment Clause experienced a remarkable transformation in the 
eighty years between the framings of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.5 Examining state constitutions‘ establishment clauses and 
their interpretations by state courts—important sources heretofore largely 
ignored in this discussion—this Note reinforces this story of change. As I 
will argue, these documents show that in 1789, lawmakers and courts saw 
state religious establishments as consistent with personal religious 
freedom; whether to establish religion—in the most basic sense, to devote 
government money to churches—was simply a choice to be made by 
legislatures. By Reconstruction, however, Americans had come to 
understand the values embodied by the Clause differently. Proscribing 
religious establishments by means of state constitutional provisions, many 
nineteenth-century Americans believed religious establishments 
necessarily violated a treasured individual right—just the sort of freedom 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade states to infringe. 
The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state 
establishments is not uncontroversial. More than sixty-five years after 
Everson v. Board of Education,6 Justice Thomas, for example, continues 
to criticize the Vinson Court‘s decision to apply the Establishment Clause 
against the states. According to Justice Thomas, incorporation is 
inconsistent with the eighteenth-century understanding of the Clause. ―I 
accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an individual 
right [to practice one‘s religion], applies against the States through the 
                                                                                                                                    
build up and implement the Constitution, but when they do so they must always remain faithful to the 
basic framework.‖). 
3. See id. at 138-39. 
4. Consider, for example, the death penalty and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 
Though the Framers endorsed the use of capital punishment for a broad range of crimes, see John F. 
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 899, 959 (2011), more recent discussions about drastically limiting its use often ―turn on whether 
the Court has adequately recognized a genuine trend [in state practices], and whether the trend marks a 
truly enduring constitutional value or merely reflects a temporary and revisable policy preference.‖ 
Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 571 
n.65 (2009). 
5. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 248-54 
(1998); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of the 
Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 511-12 (2006); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the 
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995). 
6. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
2
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol25/iss1/9
VANSANT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013 10:14 AM 
2013] VanSant 151 
Fourteenth Amendment,‖ he explains.7 On the other hand, ―the 
Establishment Clause is best understood as a federalism provision‖ that 
prevents the federal government both from instituting and from 
dismantling state establishments, ―but [that] does not protect any 
individual right.‖8 Since the Clause does not safeguard a ―privilege[ or] 
immunit[y] of citizenship,‖9 he argues, incorporation is irrational.10 For 
Justice Thomas, the consequence is clear: ―[T]he Establishment Clause 
restrains only the Federal Government,‖ not the states.11 
Academics have long expressed ideas similar to Justice Thomas‘s.12 
Daniel O. Conkle helpfully summarizes this view: ―[The Establishment 
Clause] embraced only a policy of federalism on the subject of church and 
state‖ rather than ―a general principle concerning the proper role of 
government and the rights of individuals.‖13 Thus, ―[t]o ‗incorporate‘ this 
policy of states‘ rights for application against the states would be utter 
nonsense . . . .‖14 In a 1991 article, Akhil Amar also cited the Clause‘s 
federalist origins to argue against incorporation: ―to apply the clause 
against a state government is precisely to eliminate its rights to choose 
whether to establish a religion—a right explicitly confirmed by the 
establishment clause itself!‖15 
                                                          
7. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Justice Thomas also elaborates on his opposition to the incorporation of the Establishment Clause in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (repeating that the Clause‘s 
―original meaning‖—in Balkin‘s ―expected application‖ sense—militates against incorporation); 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (―The text and history of 
the Clause may well support the view that the Clause is not incorporated against the States precisely 
because the Clause shielded state establishments from congressional interference.‖). Others argue 
against a federalist interpretation of the Clause‘s original meaning. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-
16; and Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 761, 767 (2005). See generally Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A 
Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 (2006) (providing a useful summary of both sides of the 
debate). 
8. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
10. See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
11. Utah Highway Patrol Ass‘n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 21 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
12. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 167-68 (1986) (noting that early opponents of Everson included ―eminent constitutional 
scholars . . . Edward S. Corwin and Robert G. McCloskey‖). Some also make textualist arguments, 
insisting that the word ―respecting‖ indicates a neutrality about the desirability of state establishments. 
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7, at 1882. This evidence would be more relevant to an inquiry into 
―original meaning as original semantic content,‖ though the very vagueness of the words ―respecting‖ 
and ―establishment‖ invite future generations to fill in content. Balkin, supra note 2, at 552-53. 
13. Daniel O. Conkle, Towards a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
1113, 1141 (1988). 
14. Id.; see also Vincent Philip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and 
the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 631 (2006) (―Because the original 
meaning [of the Establishment Clause] only recognizes a jurisdictional boundary that protects state 
authority, it cannot logically be incorporated to apply against state governments.‖). 
15. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1158 (1991) 
[hereinafter Amar, Constitution]. Amar later adjusted his view. See AMAR, supra note 5, at 254 (―[A] 
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However, as this Note will suggest, such analysis misses the point. To 
reach the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment compels the 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, we must look to Americans‘ 
understanding of the Clause in the 1860s rather than in the 1790s. The 
question is simple: In the nineteenth-century view, did the Establishment 
Clause protect a fundamental personal liberty rightfully protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment? When it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the inquiry is profoundly originalist; it demands attention to the ―original 
meaning‖ of the Fourteenth Amendment as intended by its framers, as 
well as its ―original expected application‖ as understood by its ratifiers.16 
Yet its answer also demands an exercise in (historical) living 
constitutionalism. As I will argue, investigating how Reconstruction-era 
Americans interpreted the meaning of the Establishment Clause requires 
not simply a reference to the previous century‘s history, as if the Clause 
were etched in stone, but a recognition of, as Balkin writes, nineteenth-
century ―changes in constitutional culture—what ordinary citizens and 
legal and political elites believe[d] the Constitution mean[t].‖17 
As the first comprehensive examination of state religious freedom 
provisions and their interpretations by state courts, this Note explores 
these changes. That these sources have been neglected is surprising. 
Unlike selected state court decisions from Northern states or evidence 
from Congress‘s territorial administration, state constitutions and their 
interpretations shed light on nineteenth-century lawmakers‘, judges‘, and 
citizens’ changing understanding of religious freedom throughout the 
nation; in Balkin‘s words, they show us decisively what was ―on-the-wall‖ 
in ―constitutional [and political] common sense.‖18 A thorough analysis of 
these sources will lead to two related conclusions: first, that the right ―to 
be free from government-imposed religious establishments‖19—a right 
associated with Establishment Clause—was presented as a fundamental 
individual right of all Americans by the 1860s; and, second, that the line 
between free exercise and nonestablishment—the absence of government 
involvement in religion—was less distinct than it is today, as, in the 
nineteenth-century view, both concepts combined to form the amorphous 
                                                                                                                                    
law that proclaimed Utah a Mormon state should be suspect whether we call this a violation of the 
establishment principles, free-exercise principles, equal-protection principles, equal-citizenship 
principles, or religious-liberty principles.‖); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 171 (2012) (―To the extent that the establishment clause was, like the Tenth 
Amendment, a states‘-rights provision, the clause did not sensibly incorporate against the states. Yet 
deep principles of American religious liberty and religious equality did apply against the states as 
proper ‗privileges or immunities‘ of American citizenship.‖). 
16. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 100-01. 
17. Id. at 320. 
18. Jack M. Balkin, Wrong the Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 
B.U. L. REV. 677, 702 (2005). 
19. Lash, supra note 5, at 1088. 
4
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individual liberty of ―freedom of conscience.‖20 The latter‘s implication is 
clear. If nonestablishment was considered inextricable from the individual 
right of freedom of conscience, a theory like Justice Thomas‘s that 
presents the issues of establishment and free exercise as fundamentally 
different rests on a shaky foundation. To corroborate these ideas, this Note 
will examine two kinds of sources from the time: those that likewise link 
nonestablishment to an individual right, and those that present alternative 
interpretations to more recent views of religious freedom that either 
feature specific definitions of nonestablishment and free exercise or 
clearly differentiate between the two.21 
But that is not enough. To justify the incorporation of the Establishment 
Clause, it is necessary also to learn how this change in constitutional 
culture affected the Fourteenth Amendment‘s framers. An examination of 
documents written in the 1860s and 1870s will suggest that 
nonestablishment was on lawmakers‘ (and Americans‘) minds, and thus 
that the new understanding of the Establishment Clause is rightfully 
incorporated according to the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will examine changes in the 
religion clauses of state constitutions. As I will demonstrate, while many 
eighteenth-century state constitutions sanctioned or mandated religious 
establishments, many of those written closer in time to the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s framing include the principle of nonestablishment in the 
personal rights sections of the documents. Furthermore, many state 
constitutions feature provisions containing both nonestablishment and 
free-exercise concepts, suggesting that the two ideas were considered 
either interchangeable or inextricably linked in the nineteenth century, and 
thus that nonestablishment was not a choice to be made by state 
governments, but rather an integral component of individuals‘ religious 
liberty. 
Parts II and III will turn to state court decisions and other primary 
sources, respectively. By studying the language of state court judges as 
they interpreted their state constitutions, I will show that they, too, often 
referred to nonestablishment as a fundamental right of Americans and did 
not employ the twentieth-century distinction between nonestablishment 
and free-exercise concepts. The popular writings about church and state 
and the contemporaneous legal analyses examined in Part III will confirm 
that many nineteenth-century Americans beyond the courts shared these 
views. Parts II and III, in short, examine changes in constitutional culture. 
                                                          
20. See id. at 1141 (―Nonestablishment in the mid-nineteenth century was an aspect of the ‗rights 
of conscience‘ . . . .‖); see also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002) (detailing the history and meaning of ―freedom of conscience‖). 
21. See, e.g., Amar, Constitution, supra note 15, at 1159 (―The Fourteenth Amendment might best 
be read as incorporating free exercise, but not establishment, principles against state governments.‖). 
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Finally, Part IV will return to originalism, addressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s framers‘ and their contemporaries‘ understanding of the 
Amendment‘s provisions. By examining the statements of nineteenth-
century lawmakers and legal scholars, I will argue that the Establishment 
Clause is rightfully applied against the states. Of course, for living 
originalists, such an inquiry is largely unnecessary; what Balkin calls the 
―glittering generalities‖ of the Fourteenth Amendment leave room for 
construction regardless of original meaning and/or original expected 
application.22 However, this Note aims to justify Establishment Clause 
incorporation even to those who demand its consistency with the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s original meaning—and, at the same time, to 
apply to an historical period one of Balkin‘s key points: that actors outside 
the Supreme Court play important roles in constitutional construction. 
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
State constitutions provide an ideal starting point for an examination of 
changing conceptions of nonestablishment in the years between the 
framings of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. For the 
simple reason that they are much more numerous than the single federal 
Constitution, state constitutions provide a window into the values of 
Americans throughout the growing nation. Major regional differences 
were not uncommon in antebellum America—views on slavery, among 
other issues, divided nineteenth-century citizens—so cross-regional 
commonalities in state constitutions speak to the widespread acceptance of 
certain fundamental principles.23 Furthermore, the large number of state 
constitutions is commensurate with a greater volume of judicial opinions 
interpreting them. Especially at a time when U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions on the issue of religion were few and far between, the opinions 
of states‘ highest courts provide important insights about how state 
governments—and, through them, state citizens—understood constitutions 
and the rights contained therein. But that is the subject of Part II. 
State constitutions also have other advantages for this study. For one 
thing, they were often amended or replaced. Thus, both what is changed 
and what is retained between versions of constitutions are likely 
illustrative of the prevailing views in the state at the time. Moreover, many 
constitutions are clearly organized. Specifically, they contain clear 
sections or categories (for example, ―Declaration of Rights‖) that suggest 
how those who framed and ratified the constitutions understood specific 
                                                          
22. See Balkin, supra note 4, at 555. 
23. For an analysis of fundamental rights in state constitutions, see Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah 
E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified 
in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 
(2008). 
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provisions in the context of the document as a whole. Given that state 
constitutions are often organized differently from their federal 
counterpart—in many cases, the states copied the U.S. Constitution and 
Bill of Rights in neither form nor substance24—the classification of state 
establishment clauses is particularly significant. 
A. How Many State Constitutions Had Establishment Clauses, and How 
Did They Classify Them? 
Analogs to the federal Establishment Clause were commonplace in pre-
1868 state constitutions. By Steven Calabresi and Sarah Agudo‘s count, 
―[t]wenty-seven states—or two-thirds of the thirty-seven states that 
formed the United States in 1868—had clauses in their constitutions 
that . . . explicitly prohibited the establishment of a state religion.‖25 
Moreover, seventy-one percent of the population resided in these states.26 
As noted by Calabresi and Agudo, this evidence on its own provides at 
least some support for this Note‘s hypothesis: the great majority of mid-
nineteenth-century Americans lived with the expectation that their state 
was—and, perhaps, should be—constitutionally forbidden from 
establishing religion;27 indeed, these constitutions‘ framers did not even 
want to give state legislators the option of establishing religion. Applying 
the federal Establishment Clause to these states, therefore, would 
seemingly make little difference. But Calabresi and Agudo take their 
analysis a step further. ―The fact that establishment clauses were so 
common in state constitutions,‖ they argue, ―impl[ies] that freedom from 
an establishment was an individual fundamental right‖ at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.28 
Calabresi and Agudo, however, skip a step in their reasoning. It does not 
follow that because most Americans lived in an establishment-free state, 
they necessarily saw nonestablishment as a personal right. Alternatively, 
nineteenth-century Americans might simply have believed that their states 
chose constitutionally to forbid establishment, but that adopting an official 
religion is not necessarily inconsistent with fundamental individual rights. 
After all, as Lash notes, ―[u]nder the federal Establishment Clause, 
                                                          
24. For example, Alabama‘s constitution splits up its free exercise and establishment clauses into 
different sections. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. 1, §§ 5, 7, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 32, 33 (photo. reprint 2001) (2d ed. 1878). One of Connecticut‘s constitutions 
includes an entire article devoted solely to religion. See CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 7, reprinted in 1 
POORE, supra, at 258, 264. 
25. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 23, at 31-32. In their analysis, Calabresi and Agudo include 
clauses that specifically forbade the establishment of a state religion and those that ―prohibit[ed] 
establishment by preventing the government from forcing citizens to financially support any specific 
religion.‖ Id. 
26. Id. at 32. 
27. See id. 
28. Id. 
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religious establishments were neither good nor bad—they were simply a 
matter left to the states.‖29 
Instead, it is the way in which states classified and presented their 
establishment clauses—not simply the provisions‘ existence—that 
suggests that ―[m]ost Americans in 1868 would have thought that their 
privileges or immunities included an individual right to be free from a 
religious establishment.‖30 The states in which nonestablishment is listed 
under ―Rights‖ or a similar heading form a diverse group culturally and 
geographically, from rural Alabama31 to industrial New Jersey,32 and from 
Florida33 in the Southeast to Oregon34 in the Northwest, among many 
others.35 That the establishment clauses are included in these articles—
                                                          
29. Lash, supra note 5, at 1091-92. 
30. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 23, at 32. 
31. ALA CONST. of 1867 art. 1, § 5, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 60, 61 (Declaration of 
Rights); ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 48, 48 (Declaration 
of Rights); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. 1, § 7, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 32, 33 
(Declaration of Rights). 
32. N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1314, 1314 (Rights 
and Privileges). 
33. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 23, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 347, 348 
(Declaration of Rights); FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 332, 
333 (Declaration of Rights); FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 
317, 317 (Declaration of Rights). 
34. ORE. CONST. of 1857, art. 1, § 5, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1492, 1492 (Bill of 
Rights). 
35. See ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 120, 121 
(Declaration of Rights); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 101, 
102 (Declaration of Rights); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 
470, 471 (Bill of Rights); ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. 13, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 
449, 466 (Declaration of Rights); IND. CONST. of 1851, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 
24, at 512, 513 (Bill of Rights); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, 
at 552, 552-53 (Bill of Rights); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, 
at 536, 537 (Bill of Rights); KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 7 reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 
24, at 629, 631 (Bill of Rights); KAN. CONST. of 1858, art. 1, § 7, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, 
at 613, 615 (Bill of Rights); KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. 1, § 7, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 
580, 581 (Bill of Rights); KY. CONST. of 1850, art. 13, § 5, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 
668, 684 (Bill of Rights); ME. CONST. of 1820, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 788, 
788-89 (Declaration of Rights); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. 1, § 16, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 
24, at 1029, 1030 (Bill of Rights); MO. CONST. of 1865, art. 1, § 11, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 
24, at 1136, 1137 (Declaration of Rights); MO. CONST. of 1820, art. 13, §§ 4, 5, reprinted in 2 POORE, 
supra note 24, at 1104, 1114 (Declaration of Rights); NEB. CONST. of 1866-67, art. 1, § 16, reprinted 
in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1203, 1204-05 (Declaration of Rights); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. 1, § 7, 
reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1465, 1466 (Bill of Rights); PA. CONST. of 1838, art. 9, § 3, 
reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1557, 1564 (Declaration of Rights); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. 
1, § 10, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1646, 1646 (Declaration of Rights); TENN. CONST. of 
1870, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1694, 1695 (Declaration of Rights); TENN. 
CONST. of 1834, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1677, 1677 (Declaration of 
Rights); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. 11, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1667, 1673-74 
(Declaration of Rights); TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1801, 
1801 (Bill of Rights); TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1784, 
1784 (Bill of Rights); TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1767, 
1767 (Bill of Rights); W. VA. CONST. of 1861-63, art. 2, § 9, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 
1977, 1978-79 (Bill of Rights); WISC. CONST. of 1848, art. 1, § 18, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 
24, at 2028, 2029 (Declaration of Rights); see also, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 4, reprinted 
in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 258, 259 (including in the Declaration of Rights a provision forbidding 
8
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instead of under a more general heading36—speaks to the way in which the 
constitutions‘ framers, and the states‘ citizens, thought about freedom 
from establishment. For Pennsylvanians, for example, nonestablishment 
was not simply one of two acceptable choices; it was nothing less than a 
―general, great, and essential principle[] of liberty and free government.‖37 
An Alabama Supreme Court Justice made it even clearer that that state‘s 
Declaration of Rights presented individual liberties. The document, he 
noted, is ―nothing more than an enumeration of certain rights,‖ yet its 
provisions are sacred: ―[W]e look in vain to any other source, to ascertain 
the rights secured to the citizen . . . .‖38 And, in almost every state, 
nonestablishment was one of them. 
The syntax of many religious freedom provisions likewise reflects 
nonestablishment‘s status as an individual liberty. Indeed, many state 
constitutions, especially those framed later in the nineteenth century, 
featured clauses that banned mandatory contributions to churches—an 
important nonestablishment principle—that read like individual-rights 
provisions. The Wisconsin Constitution‘s provisions are illustrative: ―The 
right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of 
his own conscience shall never be infringed, nor shall any man be 
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain 
any ministry, against his consent.‖39  
                                                                                                                                    
favoritism towards one Christian group over another); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 1 
POORE, supra note 24, at 278, 278-79 (classifying its establishment clause as a provision ―reserved out 
of the general powers of Government,‖ thus echoing the Tenth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution); ILL. CONST. OF 1818, art. 8, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 439, 446 
(identifying nonestablishment as among the ―general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free 
government‖); IND. CONST. of 1816, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 499, 500 
(same); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. 10, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 657, 666 (same); MD. 
CONST. of 1776, art. 33, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 817, 819-20 (including in the 
Declaration of Rights that citizens are not compelled to support any specific religious sect but leaving 
the legislature the option to support Christianity generally through taxes); N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, 
§ 6, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1294, 1294 (asserting in the Bill of Rights that no one may 
be compelled to support a church or sect that he does not agree with, though Christianity was 
established); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 1, § 6, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1280, 1281 
(same); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. 8, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1455, 1461 
(identifying nonestablishment as among the ―general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free 
government‖); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. 9, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1548, 1554 
(referring to nonestablishment as one of the ―general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free 
government‖). 
36. The Alabama Constitution of 1819‘s Article 6, for example, is entitled ―General Provisions‖ 
and includes sections on education, establishment of banks, and slavery. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. 6, 
reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 32, 41-44; cf. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. 7, reprinted in 2 
POORE, supra note 24, at 1767, 1776-79 (including provisions on women‘s property rights and the 
quartering of soldiers under the heading ―General Provisions‖). 
37. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. 9, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1557, 1564. 
38. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 362 (Ala. 1838). 
39.  WISC. CONST. of 1848, art. 1 § 18, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 2028, 2029; see 
ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 48, 48 (―[N]o one shall be 
compelled by law to attend any place of worship, nor to pay any tithes, taxes, or other rate, for 
building or repairing any place of worship, or for maintaining any minister or ministry . . . .‖); ARK. 
CONST. of 1864, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 120, 121 (―[N]o man can, of right, 
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be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his 
consent . . . .‖); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 101, 102 
(―[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain 
any ministry against his consent.‖); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 
24, at 289, 289 (―[N]o man shall, or ought to be compelled to attend any religious worship, to 
contribute to the erection or support of any place of worship, or to the maintenance of any ministry, 
against his own free will and consent . . . .‖); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 1 POORE, 
supra note 24, at 278, 278 (―[N]o man shall or ought to be compelled to attend any religious worship, 
to contribute to the erection or support of any place of worship, or to the maintenance of any ministry, 
against his own free will and consent . . . .‖); GA. CONST. of 1798, art. 4, § 10, reprinted in 1 POORE, 
supra note 24, at 388, 395 (―No person within this State shall, upon any pretence, . . . be compelled to 
attend any place of worship contrary to his own faith and judgment; nor shall he ever be obliged to pay 
tithes, taxes, or any other rate, for the building or repairing any place or worship, or for the 
maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or hath voluntarily 
engaged to do.‖); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 470, 471 
(―No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place or worship against his 
consent . . . .‖); ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. 13, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 449, 466 
(―[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place or worship, or to maintain 
any ministry against his consent . . . .‖); ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. 8, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra 
note 24, at 439, 446 (―[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place or 
worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent . . . .‖); IND. CONST. OF 1851, art. 1, § 4, 
reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 512, 513 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent.‖); IND. CONST. of 1816, 
art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 499, 500 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent . . . .‖); IOWA 
CONST. of 1857, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 552, 552-53 (―[N[or shall any 
person be compelled to attend any place or worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or 
repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any minister or ministry.‖); IOWA CONST. of 1846, 
art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 536, 537 (―[N]or shall any person be compelled to 
attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing places of worship, 
or the maintenance of any minister or ministry.‖); KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 7, reprinted 
in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 629, 631 (―[N]or shall any person be compelled to attend or support any 
form of worship . . . .‖); KAN. CONST. of 1858, art. 1, § 7, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 613, 
615 (―No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any 
form of worship against his consent . . . .‖); KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. 1, § 7, reprinted in 1 POORE, 
supra note 24, at 580, 581 (―No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of 
worship, or maintain any form of worship against his consent . . . .‖); KY. CONST. of 1850, art. 13, § 5, 
reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 668, 684 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent . . . .‖); KY. CONST. OF 
1799, art. 10, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 657, 666 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to 
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent . . . .‖); 
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. 12, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 647, 654 (―[N]o man of right can 
be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his 
consent . . . .‖); MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 36, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 
24, at 888, 890 (―[N]or ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain or contribute, unless 
on contract, to maintain any place of worship, or any ministry . . . .‖); MD. CONST. of 1864, 
Declaration of Rights, § 36, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 859, 861 (―[N]or ought any person 
to be compelled to frequent or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any place of 
worship or any ministry . . . .‖); MD. CONST. of 1851, Declaration of Rights, § 33, reprinted in 1 
POORE, supra note 24, at 837, 839 (―[N]or ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain or 
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any place of worship or any ministry . . . .‖); MICH. CONST. 
of 1835, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 983, 983 (―[N]o person can of right be 
compelled to attend, erect, or support, against his will, any place of religious worship, or pay any 
tithes, taxes, or other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion.‖); MINN. 
CONST. of 1857, art. 1, § 16, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1029, 1030 (―[N]or shall any man 
be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or 
ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent . . . . ); MO. CONST. of 1865, art. 1, § 10, reprinted in 2 
POORE, supra note 24, at 1136, 1137 (―[N]o person can be compelled to erect, support, or attend any 
place of worship, or maintain any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion . . . .‖); MO. CONST. of 
1820, art. 13, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1104, 1114 (―[N]o man can be compelled to 
erect, support, or attend any place of worship, or to maintain any minister of the gospel or teacher of 
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religion . . . .‖); NEB. CONST. of 1866-1867, art. 1, § 16, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1203, 
1204 (―No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship . . . against his 
consent . . . .‖); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1314, 1314 
(―[N]or shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any 
church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, 
contrary to what he believes to be right, or has deliberately or voluntarily engaged to perform.‖); N.J. 
CONST. of 1776, art. 18, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1310, 1313 (―[N]or shall any person, 
within this Colony, ever be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building 
or repairing any other church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any 
minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or has deliberately or voluntarily 
engaged himself to perform.‖); N.C. CONST. of 1776, section 34, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, 
at 1409, 1413-14 (―[N]either shall any person, on any pretence whatsoever, . . . be obliged to pay, for 
the purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of worship, or for the maintenance of any 
minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes right, or has voluntarily and personally engaged to 
perform . . . .‖); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. 1, § 7, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1465, 1466 
(―[N]o person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or  maintain any 
ministry, against his consent . . . .‖); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. 8, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 
24, at 1455, 1461 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or 
to maintain any ministry, against his consent . . . .‖); PA. CONST of 1838, art. 9, § 3, reprinted in 2 
POORE, supra note 24, at 1557, 1564 (―[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support 
any place or worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent . . . .‖); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 
2, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1540, 1541 (―[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled 
to  . . . erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own 
free will and consent . . . .‖); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. 1, § 3 , reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 
1603, 1604 (―[N]o man shall be compelled . . . to support any religious worship, place, or ministry 
whatever, except in fulfillment of his own voluntary contract . . . .‖); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 38, 
reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1620, 1627 (―No person shall, by law, be obliged to pay 
towards the maintenance and support of a religious worship that he does not freely join in, or has not 
voluntarily engaged to support.‖); TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 
24, at 1694, 1695 (―[N]o man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of 
worship, or to maintain any minister, against his consent . . . .‖); TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. 1, § 3, 
reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1677, 1677 (―[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any minister, against his consent . . . .‖); TENN. 
CONST. of 1796, art. 11, § 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1667, 1673 (―[N]o man can of 
right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry 
against his consent . . . .‖); TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 
1801, 1801 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry against his consent.‖); TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. 1, § 4, reprinted in 2 POORE, 
supra note 24, at 1784, 1784 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of 
worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent . . . .‖); TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. 1, § 4, 
reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 1767, 1767 (―[N]o man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent . . . .‖); VT. CONST. of 
1793, chapter 1, art. 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1875, 1875 (―[N]o man ought to, or of 
right can, be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place or worship, or 
maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of his conscience . . . . .‖); VT. CONST. of 1786, chapter 
1, art. 3, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1866, 1868 (―[N]o man ought, or of right can be 
compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect, or support any place or worship, or maintain any 
minister, contrary to the dictates of his conscience . . . . .‖); VT. CONST. of 1777, chapter 1, art. 3, 
reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1857, 1859 (―[N]o man ought, or of right can be compelled to 
attend any religious worship, or erect, or support any place or worship, or maintain any minister, 
contrary to the dictates of his conscience . . . . .‖); W. VA. CONST. of 1861-1863, art. 2, § 9, reprinted 
in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1977, 1978 (―No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . . . .‖); see also CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 7, § 1, 
reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 258, 264 (establishing Christianity, but stating that ―no person 
shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be classed with, or associated to, any congregation, 
church, or religious association . . . .‖); MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 33, reprinted 
in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 817, 819 (establishing Christianity, but explaining that no person 
―ought . . . to be compelled to frequent or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any 
particular place of worship, or any particular ministry . . . .‖). But see MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. 4, §§ 
39-42, in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 995, 999-1000 (classifying the state‘s religious freedom 
provisions under the article entitled ―Legislative Department,‖ and thus presenting religious freedom 
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 By making the citizen the subject of the state‘s establishment clause, the 
constitution‘s framers make clear that nonestablishment is not simply a 
principle of good government, but rather a personal right affecting 
individuals. Not surprisingly, the syntax of the state‘s double-jeopardy 
clause—which undoubtedly expresses an individual right—is identical.40 
B. Did State Constitutions Differentiate Between Nonestablishment and 
Free-Exercise Rights? 
But an investigation of state establishment clauses requires more than an 
examination of their classification and syntax; it is important also to 
consider both their content and their context within the state constitutions‘ 
(and the federal Constitution‘s) religious freedom provisions. In doing so, 
we will find that nineteenth-century Americans understood 
nonestablishment and free exercise quite differently from the twentieth-
century Justices who devised the doctrine of incorporation. 
In Everson,41 Justice Black imbued the few words of the federal 
Establishment Clause with copious—and specific—meaning. Writing for 
the Court, Justice Black explained that 
[t]he ―establishment of religion‖ clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force 
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing 
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may 
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups or vice versa.42 
Justice Black‘s definition stuck. Law students today learn not only that 
certain laws implicate ―establishment interests,‖ but also that 
                                                                                                                                    
as a limitation on the legislature rather than as a right of the people).  
40. WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. 1, § 8, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 2028, 2028 (―[N]o 
person for the same offence shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.‖). Other constitutions had individual-rights 
provisions that mirrored the structure (―No person shall be. . .‖) of many religion clauses. See, e.g., 
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. 8, § 11, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 439, 447 (―No person shall, 
for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of his life and limb . . . .‖); NEB. CONST. of 1866-1867, 
art. 1, § 8, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1203, 1204 (―[N]o person for the same offence shall 
be put twice in jeopardy of punishment . . . .‖). 
41. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S 1 (1947). 
42. Id. at 15-16. 
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―establishment interests‖ are different from ―free exercise interests‖43—
though, as Justice Black admits, the two are undoubtedly ―interrelat[ed]‖ 
and ―complementary.‖44 The stark distinction is not illogical. For one 
thing, it is consistent with the text of the First Amendment, which 
separates the two clauses with a comma.45 Moreover, it reflects the 
experience of the contemporary United Kingdom, for example, which 
maintains a religious establishment but still protects the rights of free 
exercise. Nonetheless, the framers of many of the pre-Fourteenth 
Amendment state constitutions did not see such a clear-cut difference. The 
early state constitutions indicate both that establishment itself was much 
more ill-defined than Justice Black admitted and that free exercise and 
establishment interests were not well differentiated but instead together 
constituted a more general individual right, the freedom of conscience. 
The Alabama Constitution of 1819 illustrates these points. Though the 
document features typical (and fairly detailed) establishment46 and free-
exercise47 provisions, it also includes another section that combines 
establishment and free-exercise ideas: 
No person within this State shall, upon any pretence, be deprived 
of the inestimable privilege of worshipping God in the manner 
most agreeable to his own conscience [free exercise]; nor be 
compelled to attend any place of worship [establishment]; nor shall 
any one ever be obliged to pay any tithes, taxes, or other rate, for 
the building or repairing any place of worship, or for the 
maintenance of any minister or ministry [establishment].48 
This eclectic section demonstrates two things: first, that establishment and 
free exercise themselves were not particularly well-defined ideas (one 
                                                          
43. Id. at 15. 
44. Indeed, that Justice Black includes the principle that ―[n]o person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs‖—a provision that reads like a definition of 
the Free Exercise Clause—in his explanation of the Establishment Clause suggests just how 
fundamentally intertwined the two concepts still are, despite assertions to the contrary. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
46. ―There shall be no establishment of religion by law; no preference shall ever be given by law 
to any religious sect, society, denomination, or mode of worship; and no religious test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under this state.‖ ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. 1, § 
7, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 32, 33. 
47. ―No person shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his religious profession, sentiments, or 
persuasions, provided he does not disturb others in their religious worship.‖ ALA. CONST. of 1819 art. 
1, § 5, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 32, 33. 
48. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 32, 33. The Georgia 
Constitution of 1798 likewise curiously combines the two concepts. The first clause of the 
establishment section combines both free-exercise and establishment provisions—―No person within 
this State shall, upon any pretense, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping God in a 
manner agreeable to his own conscience [free exercise], nor be compelled to attend any place of 
worship contrary to his own faith and judgment [establishment]‖—while the second clause only 
addresses establishment: ―[N]or shall he ever be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rate, for the 
building or repairing any place of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary 
to what he believes to be right or hath voluntarily engaged to do.‖ GA. CONST. of 1798, art. 4, § 10, 
reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 388, 395. 
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would think that the Establishment Clause alone would foreclose the 
possibility of state-compelled tithes);49 and, second, that establishment and 
free exercise were not clearly differentiated. 
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 articulates yet another kind of 
association between free exercise and establishment. Rather than 
presenting the two as separate yet complementary concepts, the document 
sets up the existence of a state-imposed religious establishment in direct 
opposition to free exercise by using the word ―but‖: ―[T]here shall be no 
establishment of any one religious church or denomination in this State, in 
preference to any other . . . but all persons shall be at liberty to exercise 
their own mode of worship . . . .‖50 In other words, a government-imposed 
religious establishment is nothing short of antithetical to the free exercise 
of religion. If this is so, applying the Free Exercise Clause against the 
states—without simultaneously guaranteeing nonestablishment—is not 
sufficient (ironically) to protect individuals‘ free exercise rights. The 
opinions of states‘ highest courts, as we shall see in Part II, similarly 
created complicated connections between establishment and free exercise. 
C. What Do Changes in Constitutions Say About Popular Views of 
Nonestablishment? 
It is important to remember, however, that such establishment clauses 
were not so common in the earlier years of the nineteenth century. Indeed, 
their introduction into state constitutions reflects an important alteration in 
state legislatures‘—and state citizens‘—views of establishment in 
America‘s first few decades. According to Amar, ―[i]n the 1780s, several 
                                                          
49. The Iowa Constitution of 1846 is also illustrative. Its nonestablishment section echoes the 
federal Establishment Clause—―[t]he general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion‖—yet nevertheless declares that no one may ―be compelled to attend any place of worship, 
pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any 
minister of ministry.‖ IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 536, 
537. 
50. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. 34, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1409, 1413-14; accord 
W. VA. CONST. of 1861-1863, art. 2, § 9, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1977, 1978-79 (―No 
man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever; 
nor shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods, or otherwise 
suffer, on account of his religious belief; but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to 
maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish, or 
enlarge their civil capacities.‖) (emphasis added); see also MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 23, 
reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 24, at 1081, 1082 (―[N]o preference shall ever be given by law to 
any religious sect or mode of worship, but the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the 
different modes of worship shall ever be held sacred . . . .‖) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the 
Connecticut Constitution of 1818—which does privilege Christians over non-Christians—sets up a 
similar relationship between free exercise and establishment, suggesting that nonestablishment 
principles make the free exercise of religion possible: 
 It being the duty of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of 
the Universe, and their right to render that worship in the mode most consistent with the 
dictates of their consciences, no person shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be 
classed with, or associated to, any congregation, church, or religious association . . . .  
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 7, § 1, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 258, 264. 
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states featured sectarian establishments; by the 1860s none did.‖51 The 
changes were dramatic. In general, state legislators did not simply vote to 
abolish their state‘s establishment; instead, they crafted entirely new 
constitutions or extensive amendments, putting the proposals to a vote of 
the citizens. In fact, in Massachusetts, it was the citizens themselves who 
rejected ―a modified establishment that extended benefits to non-
Protestant teachers,‖52 a vote that paved the way for the establishment‘s 
complete abolition in 1833. The amendment that dissolved the 
establishment represented the only time in a century that a provision in the 
Massachusetts‘s Declaration of Rights was replaced,53 symbolizing the 
shift in public opinion on the subject of nonestablishment as the nineteenth 
century progressed: it had become a new right. 
Another kind of constitutional transformation also affected Americans‘ 
understanding of nonestablishment. As the nation expanded, Congress 
took control of numerous territories, yet, despite the Establishment 
Clause‘s limitations on federal legislative action, ―various territorial 
governments aided and sponsored religion in sundry ways.‖54 Amar 
explains this apparent paradox by suggesting that ―Congress, when 
legislating in a plenary way for a territory, stood in the shoes of a state 
government and could adopt the same kinds of proreligion laws that states 
could.‖55 
This regime did not last, however, as nineteenth-century Americans 
began to apply the Bill of Rights‘s restraints on Congress‘s power to 
territorial governments. This transition gave new meaning to the federal 
Establishment Clause—and to the idea of nonestablishment—by 
deemphasizing the Clause‘s federalist origins. Amar writes: 
[T]o say that, for example, the Iowa territorial legislature ―shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion‖ was 
rhetorically to say something rather different than that Congress 
should make no such law. . . . [T]o say that this legislature should 
make no law obviously implied no law in the territory.56 
Then, as territories sought to be states, delegates to constitutional 
                                                          
51. AMAR, supra note 5, at 251. 
52. DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE 
1820S, at xiii (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 2010). 
53. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, part 1, art. 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 956, 957, 
amended by MASS. CONST. of 1780 amend. art. 11, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 956, 975. 
54. See AMAR, supra note 5, at 248; Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 500 (―In governing the 
territories, Congress set aside land for religious purposes, and it financed missions, even naming 
particular religious groups to receive funds.‖) (internal citation omitted). 
55. AMAR, supra note 5, at 248. Greenawalt counters that the laws can be attributed to the fact 
that ―most members of Congress lacked a highly expansive view of what the Establishment Clause 
prohibited . . . .‖ Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 503. 
56. AMAR, supra note 5, at 249; BALKIN, supra note 2, at 203 (―Not surprisingly, the citizens in 
these territories understood the establishment clause primarily as a ban on religious establishments 
rather than a federalism provision . . . .‖). 
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conventions sometimes drafted provisions modeled on the Federal 
Clause,57 underlining the connection between the Establishment Clause 
and a new ―(substantive) nonestablishment rule‖ that had come to protect 
citizens‘ individual liberty.58 ―Words once intended to signal a reservation 
of power to state majorities were now invoked to express the rights of 
citizens against state majorities,‖ writes Kurt Lash. ―[T]he core value 
[was] transformed from federalism to nonestablishment.‖59 Constitutional 
culture had changed. 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
The documents themselves, however, are only part of the story; it is 
necessary also to understand the way in which states‘ highest courts 
interpreted their constitutions‘ religious freedom provisions. Though 
courts did not see eye to eye on all issues of religious freedom,60 they were 
generally united on an important point: nonestablishment—whatever it 
meant—was a prized American freedom in the mid-nineteenth century. 
A. Did Americans Consider Nonestablishment a Fundamental Right of 
U.S. Citizens? 
On one issue, the text of the First Amendment seems clear: it only 
applies to the federal government (―Congress‖). In 1866, a lawyer arguing 
before the Supreme Court reminded the Justices of the First Amendment‘s 
federalist origins: 
Even the freedom of religious opinion, and the rights of conscience 
which we so highly prize, are secured to us by the State 
constitutions, and find no protection in the Constitution of the 
United States. If any State were so unwise as to establish a State 
religion, and require every priest and preacher to be licensed 
before he attempted to preach or teach, there is no clause in the 
Federal Constitution that would authorize this court to pronounce 
                                                          
57. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 552, 552 
(―The general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .‖); IOWA 
CONST. of 1846, art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 24, at 536, 537 (―The general assembly 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .‖). The constitution of the proposed 
state of Deseret, which later became Utah, contained an identical provision. See DESERET CONST. of 
1862, art. 2, § 3, reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF DESERET: MEMORIAL OF THE 
LEGISLATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF UTAH TERRITORY, PRAYING FOR THE 
ADMISSION OF SAID TERRITORY INTO THE UNION AS THE STATE OF DESERET 4 (Gov‘t Printing Office 
1862) (―[T]he general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .‖). 
58. See AMAR, supra note 5, at 249. For more on an emerging national standard on freedom of 
religion, see infra Section II.A. 
59. Lash, supra note 5, at 1140. 
60. Compare, e.g., Mohney v. Cook, 26 Pa. 342, 347 (1855) (―The declaration that Christianity is 
part of the law of the land, is a summary description of an existing and very obvious condition of our 
institutions.‖), with Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 390 (1857) (―[N]either Christianity, nor any 
other system of religion, is a part of the law of this state.‖). Pennsylvania and Ohio had very similar 
establishment clauses. 
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the act unconstitutional or void . . . .61 
But other Americans—including the supreme court justices of many 
states—did not adhere to such a literal interpretation of the First 
Amendment. Instead, they presented nonestablishment as an American 
value on both the federal and state levels. 
In the 1840s, just a decade after America‘s last establishment was 
dissolved, state court justices began to present the idea of a national 
standard in issues of religion. Their statements reflected a reading of the 
First Amendment that acknowledged its federalist origins but also 
considered it—and other Bill of Rights provisions—as symbolic of ―great 
principles of civil liberty‖ that neither the national nor the state 
governments may rightfully transgress.62 One Georgia Supreme Court 
justice, for example, opined that the ideals enshrined in the First 
Amendment would be meaningless if states did not also follow them: 
[T]he doctrine is, that Congress may not [establish religion], but 
that each State Legislature may do so for itself. As if a National 
religion and State religion, a National press and State press, were 
quite separate and distinct from each other; and that the one might 
be subject to control, but the other not! Such logic, I must confess, 
fails to commend itself to my judgment.63 
A year later, a lawyer told the Supreme Court of Georgia that the First 
Amendment removed all remnants of Christianity from the state‘s law.64 
But Georgia was no special case. Indeed, similar arguments gained 
steam in the next several decades as state supreme court justices 
throughout the United States insisted that the federal Constitution stood 
for religious freedom on both a national and a state level. In Kentucky, for 
example, one justice confidently stated that ―according to the Constitution 
of the United States, politics and religion move in separate spheres clearly 
defined.‖65 A Pennsylvania justice claimed that the state judicial system 
was dedicated to ―preserving and protecting the unrestrained liberty of 
conscience guarantied by the constitution of the United States.‖66 In West 
Virginia, a justice cited the First Amendment when he explained that 
―[f]reedom and toleration in religion are characteristics of our State and 
Federal governments.‖67 And, not long before the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s adoption, a Texas justice echoed the language of the First 
Amendment as he insisted that both nonestablishment and free exercise 
                                                          
61. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 295 (1866). Note that the lawyer‘s argument 
also assumes that nonestablishment secures freedom of conscience. For more on the relationship 
between nonestablishment and the individual right of freedom of conscience, see infra Section II.B. 
62. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 368 (1852). 
63. Id. at 366. 
64. Cheeseborough, Stearns v. Van Ness, 12 Ga. 380, 383 (1853). 
65. Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 110, 116 (1868). 
66. Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848) (emphasis added). 
67. Raines v. Watson, 2 W. Va. 371, 406 (1868). 
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are American values: 
That all people of this country shall have the right to worship God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences, or not at all, if 
they prefer, and that the government shall not establish any 
religion for the people to obey, or prohibit the free exercise 
thereof, appears to be now the settled American doctrine, well 
established in the organic law of the nation and the states.68 
The Establishment Clause thus stood for a nationally recognized principle. 
The emergence of a national standard for freedom of religion was also 
evident from the increased tendency of courts to cite cases from other 
states when deciding religion cases. Courts in Maine,69 Ohio,70 
California,71 and West Virginia72 all researched other states‘ laws or 
constitutions extensively; if each state were rightfully entitled to make its 
own decisions about religion, examining other states‘ standards would 
seemingly be irrelevant. 
Perhaps the clearest example comes from Louisiana. Louisiana‘s 
admission to the Union was conditioned on the new state constitution‘s 
consistency with the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of 
Louisiana interpreted this condition as making the federal Establishment 
Clause—or, more accurately, the individual right of nonestablishment it 
represented—applicable in Louisiana: 
In the treaty of cession, the First Consul of the French Republic 
exacted a stipulation in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded 
territory, that they should be incorporated into the Union, and 
admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of the 
Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, 
and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . The States had 
already, in the Federal Constitution, forbidden Congress from 
passing any ―law concerning an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;‖ and the people of Louisiana 
were promised a full participation in the immunities and blessings, 
which such a provision was calculated to afford.73 
The fact that nonestablishment contributed to the ―immunities and 
                                                          
68. Gabel v. City of Houston, 29 Tex. 335, 337 (1867). 
69. See, e.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 403, 405, 410-11 (1854) (citing cases from 
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania). 
70. See, e.g., Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 392-97 (1853) (citing cases from Pennsylvania 
and South Carolina but contrasting Ohio‘s Sunday contracts statutes with other states‘). 
71. See, e.g., Ex Parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, 681 (1861) (―The general principles announced by 
[the California constitution‘s religion provision] are not peculiar to the Constitution of California. 
They are principles expressly asserted or impliedly recognized in almost every one of the 
Constitutions of our sister States. And in almost every State [Sabbath observance] acts . . . have been 
passed; and in every instance, it is believed, where their constitutionality has been considered, it has 
been affirmed.‖). 
72. See, e.g., Raines, 2 W. Va. at 392-96 (noting statutes in Kentucky, Wisconsin, New 
Hampshire, Alabama, Maine, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, and New York). 
73. Wardens of the Church of St. Louis v. Blanc, 8 Rob. 51, 86-87 (La. 1844). 
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blessings‖ of Americans underlines its status as an individual right 
recognized throughout the nation—an important part of American 
constitutional culture. 
B. What Was the Relationship Between Nonestablishment, Free Exercise, 
and Freedom of Conscience? 
Nonestablishment, however, was not only an individual right on its 
own; as in the state constitutions themselves, it was also inextricably 
connected with the personal liberty of free exercise. Though, as I will 
show, state courts disagreed about the exact relationship between the two, 
both were discussed as aspects of freedom of conscience. The link 
between nonestablishment and freedom of conscience underlines the 
former‘s status as a fundamental right of citizens in mid-nineteenth 
century America. 
In antebellum America, liberty of conscience was an important 
individual freedom.74 Indeed, courts throughout the nation went out of 
their way to underline its significance. The rights of conscience are 
―invaluable,‖75 declared the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; they should be 
―sacred and inviolate,‖76 added their colleagues in Virginia. In Arkansas, 
they were ―indefeasible,‖77 and, in Maine, ―inalienable.‖78 But even if 
there was broad consensus over the importance of the rights of conscience, 
courts were divided over exactly what the rights consist of. 
As Noah Feldman explains, the definitional difficulties of the liberty of 
conscience are as old as the concept itself.79 Though in early nineteenth-
century America, liberty of conscience and free exercise were sometimes 
used interchangeably—and established religion and free exercise were 
considered compatible80—nonestablishment principles were increasingly 
acknowledged as fundamental to liberty of conscience and to religious 
freedom in general. Indeed, judges throughout the country emphasized 
that recognition of nonestablishment rights was a fundamentally American 
concept. Religious freedom in the United States, as a California Supreme 
Court justice explained, was not simply about free exercise rights, or 
―toleration,‖ as in England: ―When our liberties were acquired, our 
                                                          
74. See Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence 
from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 1083, 1101 n.98. 
75. Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102, 115 (1853). 
76. Maddox v. Maddox‘s Adm‘r, 51 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804, 814 (1854). 
77. Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 262 (1850). 
78. Waite v. Merrill, 4 Me. 102, 119 (1826). For a discussion of the rights of conscience as a 
natural right, see Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 
YALE L.J. 907, 919 (1993). 
79. See Feldman, supra note 20, at 355. 
80. See, e.g., Avery v. Tyringham, 3 Mass. (3 Tyng) 160, 174 (1807) (―Let the second and third 
articles of the declaration of rights for this purpose be candidly and impartially considered . . . . In 
language strong and energetic, the religion of Protestant Christians is established. Liberty of 
conscience is secured.‖). 
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republican form of government adopted, and our Constitution framed, we 
deemed that we had attained not only toleration, but religious liberty in its 
largest sense—a complete separation between Church and State, and a 
perfect equality without distinction between all religious sects.‖81 And, a 
Delaware lawyer explained in 1848, American liberty of conscience 
embraces much more than toleration; it also includes freedom from 
establishment.82 
Feldman traces the origins of the idea to the eighteenth century: 
―Establishment of religion, the Framers‘ generation thought, often had the 
effect of compelling conscience. Going beyond compulsory church 
attendance or required forms of worship, the Framers‘ generation worried 
that conscience would be violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to 
support religious institutions with whose beliefs they disagreed.‖83 
Feldman, in fact, goes so far as to say that ―protection of liberty of 
conscience . . . undergird[ed] the Establishment Clause‖ itself; the only 
source of disagreement surrounded ―hard questions of whether certain 
forms of government support of religion should be understood as coercing 
conscience.‖84 
This debate persisted in the nineteenth century. Twenty years before the 
state dismantled its religious establishment as a result of the political 
process, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts directly confronted the issue 
of whether ―to compel [a citizen] by law to contribute money for public 
instruction in such religion or doctrine, is an infraction of his liberty of 
conscience.‖85 Though the Massachusetts court decided that the 
establishment did not violate freedom of conscience, with which they 
associated free-exercise rights—―[t]he great error,‖ the court wrote, ―lies 
in not distinguishing between liberty of conscience in religious opinions 
and worship, and the right of appropriating money by the state‖86—other 
courts expressed the opposite view, particularly later in the century. In 
Alabama, for example, a supreme court justice explained that the state‘s 
establishment clause and the clause that forbids taxes for religious 
purposes—a nonestablishment principle—both ―have for their object, the 
                                                          
81. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 502 (1858). A Missouri lawyer also insisted on the distinction 
between English toleration and American freedom. ―Read the statutes passed even since the 
Reformation, stamped as they are with the spirit of the times, and see how slowly England has learned 
the duty of tolerance alone; the right of religious freedom she has not yet acquired.‖ The Murphy & 
Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339, 358 (1867). 
82. Griffith v. State, 2 Del. Ch. 421, 443 (1848) (―There is no such thing as an established church 
in the United States; no such thing as toleration where there is universal liberty of conscience.‖). 
83. Feldman, supra note 20, at 351 (citation omitted). 
84. Id. at 416. Of course, those who favor a federalist interpretation of the original meaning of the 
Establishment Clause—the viewpoint I assume in this Note—would take issue with the first half of 
this assertion. For an explanation of this debate, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
85. Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401, 408 (1810). 
86. Id. at 409. This issue became irrelevant, of course, when Massachusetts dissolved its 
establishment. 
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preservation of the rights of conscience.‖87 Thus, on this view, 
nonestablishment is a means to an end—the maintenance of the rights of 
conscience. An Arkansas judge, however, went even further, insisting that 
freedom from such taxation is one of the rights of conscience: ―A portion 
of those rights [of conscience] consists in a freedom to worship Almighty 
God according to the dictates of every one‘s conscience, and in not being 
compellable to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry against their consent.‖88 But no matter the exact 
understanding a state adopted, nonestablishment had come to be an 
important component of an individual‘s freedom of conscience throughout 
the country by the mid-nineteenth century.   
III. NONESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA: LOOKING BEYOND COURTS 
Discussion of the emerging norm of nonestablishment in nineteenth-
century America extended beyond the courtroom, underlining the 
importance of Balkin‘s emphasis on social and political movements in 
constitutional understanding.89 In the era of the Great Awakening,90 
numerous commentators presented nonestablishment as a right cherished 
by Americans and characteristic of the new nation. Writing in the 1830s, 
Alexis de Tocqueville remarked on Americans‘ unanimity on the subject: 
To a man, they assigned primary credit for the peaceful 
ascendency of religion in their country to the complete separation 
of church and state. I state without hesitation that during my stay in 
America I met no one—not a singly clergyman or layman—who 
did not agree with the statement.91 
This Part will examine primary sources—including popular writings 
about church and state and contemporaneous legal analyses—that address 
the subject of nonestablishment in the early years of the new nation. 
Section III.A looks at writings about church and state in general to 
determine how everyday Americans—not simply the legal elite—thought 
about religious freedom. Section III.B discusses academic treatments of 
the federal Constitution, revealing that many commentators saw the 
Establishment Clause not as a federalism provision, but as an expression 
of religious liberty. As Tocqueville suggests, by the mid-nineteenth 
                                                          
87. Haynes v. Sledge, 2 Port. 530, 531 (Ala. 1835). 
88. Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 262 (1850); see also First Congregational Soc. of Woodstock v. 
Swan, 2 Vt. 222 (1829) (―The constitution . . . has secured to all the rights of conscience, as to 
religious worship, to the erecting or supporting places of worship, or to the maintaining of any 
minister . . . .‖). 
89. See Balkin, supra note 4, at 562. 
90. For a good summary of the status of religion in early nineteenth-century America, see DANIEL 
WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 
164-202 (2007). 
91. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 341 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004) 
(1835). 
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century, citizens considered nonestablishment—or a related principle, the 
separation of church and state92—as an integral component of their 
American experience. 
A. American Freedom of Conscience: Nonestablishment and Free 
Exercise Combined 
That nineteenth-century Americans considered the right of 
nonestablishment as a fundamental individual liberty is evident in the 
literature of social and political movements. The debate over 
Connecticut‘s religious establishment illustrates this point. Petitioning for 
disestablishment in the first years of the nineteenth century, the 
Connecticut Baptists explicitly argued that the state‘s establishment 
violated their fundamental rights of conscience. ―[I]n the case of the laws 
establishing religion in this State,‖ they wrote to the state legislature, ―it 
appears to us that we are deprived of those rights of conscience, which the 
Almighty God hath given us, by that, which we humbly conceive, to be 
the usurpation of men.‖93 Baptist minister John Leland even suggested that 
the state‘s religious establishment was, in a sense, anti-American—even if 
not unconstitutional. In The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, he imagined 
the effect the state‘s laws would have on American hero George 
Washington: 
How mortifying must it be to foreigners, and how far from 
conciliatory is it to citizens of the American states, that when they 
come into Connecticut to reside, they must either conform to the 
religion of Connecticut, or produce a certificate? Does this look 
like religious liberty, or human friendship? Suppose that man, 
whose name need not be mentioned, but which fills every 
American heart with pleasure and awe, should remove to 
Connecticut for his health, what a scandal would it be to the state, 
to tax him to support a Presbyterian minister, unless he produced a 
certificate, informing them that he was an Episcopalian.94 
The controversy surrounding the delivery of mail on Sundays featured 
similar rhetoric. Opposing the Sunday mail laws on nonestablishment 
                                                          
92. For an extensive discussion of the separation of church and state, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). 
93. To the Honorable General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, To Be Holden at Hartford, 
on the Second Thursday of May, 1803, the Remonstrance and Petition of a Convention of Elders and 
Brethren of the Baptist Denomination, Assembled at Bristol, on the First Wednesday of February, 
1803, in HAMBURGER, supra note 92, at 171. In his famous letter in support of the Danbury Baptists 
during this very controversy, Thomas Jefferson echoed these sentiments, citing the Establishment 
Clause itself as part of an ―expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of 
conscience.‖ Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, LIBRARY OF CONG., 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html. 
94. JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE, reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS 
OF CONSCIENCE: SELECTED READINGS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN 
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 335, 344 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009) (1791). 
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grounds, politician Richard Johnson echoed the idea that an establishment 
violates individual liberties: ―What other nations call religious toleration, 
we call religious rights. They are not exercised in virtue of governmental 
indulgence, but as rights, of which government cannot deprive any portion 
of citizens, however small. Despotic power may invade those rights, but 
justice still confirms them.‖95 
The suggestion that establishments violated American freedoms 
persisted later into the nineteenth century. As Philip Hamburger explains, 
much of this rhetoric had nativist and anti-Catholic overtones, though it 
became much more widely accepted and employed.96 For example, in A 
Plea for the West, published in 1835, Lyman Beecher warned that ―a 
union of church and state‖ would constitute ―treason‖ against the nation 
and would ―enslav[e] the people.‖97 Nativist Daniel Ullmann, Know-
Nothing candidate for governor of New York, also expressed the idea that 
the separation of church and state is a well-accepted American principle: 
―[T]he nation agrees in all its utterances—written Constitutions and 
unwritten law. The general sentiment, and the settled determination—the 
profound convictions of the American people are, that there shall be, 
forever, under this government, an entire and absolute separation between 
church and state . . . .‖98 Though an opponent of the Know-Nothings and 
their anti-Catholic campaigns, Alabama Congressman Philip Phillips 
nevertheless echoed Ullman‘s sentiment: ―Separation of Church and State, 
eternal divorce between civil and ecclesiastic jurisdiction, were cardinal 
principles with the sages and patriots to whom not only we, but all 
mankind, are indebted for this model of a republican government.‖99 
B. Constitutional Analysis  
In their analyses of the Bill of Rights, legal scholars expressed similar 
views, reflecting the change in constitutional culture. Unlike many of their 
successors in the twenty and twenty-first centuries, however, these 
scholars often did not cite the Establishment Clause‘s federalist origins,100 
instead discussing the Clause in the same way as they wrote of the other 
                                                          
95. Richard M. Johnson, A Jacksonian Criticism of the Protestant Phalanx, in CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: KEY DOCUMENTS, DECISIONS, AND COMMENTARY FROM THE PAST 
THREE CENTURIES, 101, 104 (John F. Wilson & David L. Drakeman eds., 3d ed. 2003). 
96. See HAMBURGER, supra note 92, at 193-251. 
97. LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA FOR THE WEST, in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 
KEY DOCUMENTS, DECISIONS, AND COMMENTARY FROM THE PAST THREE CENTURIES, supra note 95, 
at 100. 
98. HAMBURGER, supra note 92, at 246. 
99. Id. at 238. 
100. On the other hand, Justice Story, whose Commentaries on the Constitution was published 
earlier in the century, did not make this omission. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1873 (1833), available at http://www.constitution.org 
/js/js_344.htm. The differences in treatment likely reflect the transformation of Americans‘ 
understanding of the Establishment Clause. 
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freedoms enumerated in the first eight amendments. Given that these 
books were published around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
ratification, this treatment is particularly notable. 
Timothy Farrar‘s 1867 volume, Manual of the Constitution of the 
United States of America, is illustrative.101 Listing the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, Farrar noted that ―certain particular rights are plainly 
declared or recognized, as natural, legal, and subsisting rights of the 
people, and so made their constitutional rights . . . These rights are:—1. 
The free exercise of religion, without any legal establishment thereof.‖102 
Farrar, in other words, considered nonestablishment as a qualifier of the 
individual liberty of free exercise; he did not see them as two 
fundamentally distinct concepts to be treated differently by the ratifiers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. For Farrar, in other words, the Establishment 
Clause‘s federalist origins had faded. 
A year later, John Norton Pomeroy also failed to afford a special status 
to the Establishment Clause. In his treatise,103 he explained that all of the 
provisions of the first eight amendments protect personal rights. The fact 
that he deliberately omitted the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which 
some have compared to the Establishment Clause,104 suggests that 
Pomeroy meant to include in his discussion only the provisions that refer 
specifically to individual liberties. Pomeroy deliberately listed the 
Establishment Clause among these personal rights provisions: 
The constitutional guaranties contained in the first eight 
amendments [are] intended as barriers against any encroachments 
of the general government upon the liberties of the citizens . . . The 
following is the substance of these important restraints. No form of 
religion shall be established, nor shall the free exercise of religion 
be prohibited.105 
The failure to differentiate between the status of the Establishment Clause 
and that of the other personal-rights provisions of the First Amendment 
supports the argument that the Clause‘s federalist origins had become 
unimportant by the mid-nineteenth century—and that the Clause had come 
to represent the right of nonestablishment, as incorporable a liberty as any 
other. 
Nineteenth-century Americans from many walks of life thus agreed that 
                                                          
101. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1867). 
102. Id. at 396. 
103. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ESPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR STUDENTS, GENERAL AND PROFESSIONAL (N.Y., Hurd & 
Houghton 1868). 
104. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1193, 1263 (1992) (―[S]tate rights are not obviously limited to the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments—consider, for example, the establishment clause . . . .‖). 
105. Id. at 151-52. 
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nonestablishment, no less than free exercise, was a personal right of all 
Americans. When the Thirty-Ninth Congress gathered to frame the 
Fourteenth Amendment, they brought this understanding with them. 
IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
But why does this history matter? Without it, an originalist cannot 
understand the language in which the Fourteenth Amendment‘s framers 
discussed the Establishment Clause. This Part will address this issue. 
Though a complete investigation of the Amendment‘s framing is outside 
the scope of this Note, this Part investigates whether, according to 
statements made in the late 1860s and 1870s, the Establishment Clause 
should apply against the states. As Section IV.A will show, despite the 
notoriously sparse (and complicated) historical record, sources indicate 
that incorporating nonestablishment seems consistent with many 
nineteenth-century lawmakers‘ understanding of the Amendment—and 
thus with what Balkin describes as ―original-meaning originalis[m].‖106 By 
citing these statements, I do not take sides on the details of the 
Amendment‘s framers‘ intentions—a study that demands a book, not a 
Note—but rather show that nonestablishment was on their minds.107 
Section IV.B shifts the focus from lawmakers to commentators and 
citizens—and, thus, from original meaning to ―original expected 
application.‖108 As I will suggest, public speeches, media coverage, and 
legal commentary likewise suggest that many Reconstruction-era 
Americans believed that the Fourteenth Amendment protected them from 
state-imposed religious establishments. 
A. Original Meaning 
Which rights does the Fourteenth Amendment protect? For nearly 150 
years, scholars and jurists have attempted to understand whether the 
Amendment‘s framers intended directly to apply none,109 some,110 or all111 
of the Bill of Rights‘s provisions to the states. Given that many members 
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress as well as contemporary commentators gave 
an incomplete response to this inquiry,112 the answer was likely somewhat 
                                                          
106. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 101. 
107. An examination of theories of incorporation is outside the scope of this Note. For a useful 
summary, see AMAR, supra note 5, at 218-21. Instead, I simply aim to show that nonestablishment was 
part of the discourse of fundamental rights at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s framing. 
108. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 101. 
109. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989). 
110. This idea underlies the current doctrine of ―selective incorporation,‖ by which the Court 
engages in an historical inquiry as to whether the right in question is ―fundamental.‖ See, e.g., 
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010). 
111. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). 
112. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: 
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opaque then as now. ―It would be a curious question to solve what are the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of each of the States in the several 
states,‖ said Michigan Senator Jacob Howard, as Congress was framing 
the Amendment. ―It would be a somewhat barren discussion.‖113 
Though nonestablishment (and, sometimes, free exercise) was not 
always explicitly mentioned as protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,114 several comments suggest that freedom of religion, 
including nonestablishment values, was included in this group. As Amar 
explains, its very text links it to the First Amendment, suggesting that 
Ohio Representative John Bingham, who wrote the Fourteenth 
Amendment, intended especially to protect First Amendment rights. 
―Bingham borrowed directly from the Bill [of Rights] itself with his 
language ‗No . . . shall . . . make . . . law . . .‘—all words lifted directly 
from the First Amendment‖ (and words that immediately preceded the 
Establishment Clause).115 Indeed, in many statements, Bingham 
emphasized the Clause‘s connection to the Bill of Rights,116 and thus 
failed to differentiate between the Clause and traditional individual-rights 
provisions. In an 1866 pamphlet quoting one of his speeches before 
Congress, for example, he discussed the Bill of Rights as a whole, without 
excepting the Establishment Clause.117 In another speech the same year, 
Bingham was even more explicit about the importance of 
nonestablishment values. Noting that ―we do not ally the church and the 
State,‖ Bingham explained that ―[f]reedom of conscience is one of the 
privileges of the citizen and [of] the United States.‖118 
The Amendment‘s author continued to espouse this view after 
ratification. In an 1871 speech before Congress, Bingham reinforced the 
connection between nonestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
After reading aloud the Bill of Rights—including the Establishment 
Clause—and insisting that all the provisions should be applied to the 
states,119 Bingham emphasized the changes that resulted from ratification. 
Before the Fourteenth Amendment, he said, states ―restricted the rights of 
                                                                                                                                    
Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 404 
(2009) (noting that the historical evidence is ―fragmentary,‖ and thus that any ―judgments about 
original meaning . . . are . . . fraught with peril‖). 
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (Sen. Howard). He later proposed that 
―some of them [are] secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, . . . some 
by the first eight amendments of the Constitution . . . .‖ Id. Interestingly, his recitation of the Bill of 
Rights omitted both of the religion clauses. 
114. See, e.g., id. (Sen. Howard) (leaving out both religion clauses when listing rights). 
115. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 386 (2005). 
116. See id. at 386-87. 
117. See JOHN A. BINGHAM, ONE COUNTRY, ONE CONSTITUTION, AND ONE PEOPLE: SPEECH OF 
HON. JOHN A. BINGHAM, OF OHIO IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 28, 1866 IN 
SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ENFORCE THE BILL OF RIGHTS. 
118. This speech is quoted in Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: 
The History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77, 88 (2009). 
119. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Special Sess. app. 84 (1871) (Rep. Bingham). 
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conscience, and [the citizen] had no remedy. . . . Who dare say, now that 
the Constitution has been amended, that the nation cannot by law provide 
against all such abuses and denials of right as these in States and by 
States . . . . ?‖120 As this Note (and Bingham‘s 1866 speech) suggested, the 
term ―rights of conscience‖ included freedom from religious 
establishment. 
Bingham was not alone. In 1874, Senator Thomas Norwood of 
Georgia—whose term in Congress overlapped with a number of the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s framers‘ (including Bingham‘s)—echoed the 
Amendment‘s author‘s interpretation. In fact, Norwood even selected the 
Establishment Clause as an example as he explained his understanding of 
the Amendment. Prior to ratification, ―any State might have established a 
particular religion, or restricted freedom of speech and of the press,‖ he 
said. On the other hand, 
the instant the fourteenth amendment became a part of the 
Constitution, every State was that moment disabled from making 
or enforcing any law which would deprive any citizen of a State of 
the benefits enjoyed by citizens of the United States under the first 
eight amendments to the Federal Constitution.121 
Norwood‘s statement exemplifies the new understanding of the 
Establishment Clause as an indispensible guarantor of personal freedom. 
Like the other First Amendment provisions mentioned along with it, for 
Norwood the Clause protected an important individual liberty that the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbade states to abridge. Bingham and 
Norwood‘s statements provide support for the contention that the 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause is consistent with the intentions 
of at least some important Reconstruction-era lawmakers. 
B. Original Expected Application 
Unlike Bingham, many nineteenth-century Americans were nevertheless 
hesitant specifically to catalogue the rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Several years post-ratification, scholar and jurist Thomas M. 
Cooley expressed this reticence: ―What are privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the several states[?] [A]n examination of the judicial 
opinions . . . will illustrate the difficulty to be encountered in an attempt at 
a satisfactory enumeration.‖122 Nevertheless, though he did not advocate 
                                                          
120. Id. at 85. 
121. 2 CONG. REC. app. 242 (1874) (Rep. Norwood); see also id. at 241 (noting explicitly that 
―immunity . . . from the establishment of any religion‖ is among the ―privileges and immunities of a 
citizen of the United States‖). 
122. Thomas Cooley, The Fourteenth Amendment, in 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 648, 655-56 (4th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873) 
(photo. reprint 2008). 
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for the incorporation of all Bill of Rights provisions,123 Cooley hinted that 
he understood the Amendment to prevent the kinds of violations of 
individual rights that inevitably result from state religious establishments. 
For one thing, Cooley noted that the ―privileges and immunities‖ 
guaranteed that citizens are ―protected in life and liberty by the law.‖124 
Given the nineteenth-century association of nonestablishment with 
personal freedom, Cooley‘s statement suggests that nonestablishment 
should be incorporated, regardless of its standing as a Bill of Rights 
protection. 
Moreover, Cooley‘s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause implies 
that it, too, protects individuals from religious establishments. Noting that 
―[t]he securities of individual rights . . . cannot be too frequently declared, 
nor in too many forms of words,‖125 Cooley asks a question that illustrates 
the connection between religious freedom—both nonestablishment and 
free exercise—and equality: 
Could a law, for instance, for the compulsory attendance of all 
persons upon the church of the majority . . . be administered 
merely because everyone was included in its command? Would 
not, on the contrary, its very universality constitute offensive 
discrimination, precisely because it would compel conformity 
where equality of right would demand liberty of choice?126 
Many members of the ratifying public likely shared Cooley‘s belief that 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade state establishments. One reason is 
textual. As Amar explains, 
the very text of the Fourteenth Amendment pointed the careful 
reader to its tight interlinkage with the Bill of Rights. Bingham‘s 
specific phraseology [―privileges and immunities‖] made special 
sense to his 1860s audience, because the most widely read (if also 
reviled) judicial opinion of the era was [Justice] Taney‘s Dred 
Scott, which had explicitly described the Bill of Rights as ‗rights 
and privileges‘ of the citizens.‖127 
But the public‘s familiarity with Dred Scott did more than suggest that the 
                                                          
123. Id. at 666 (―And no more under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment than previously can the 
federal government interfere with the mode prescribed for the trial of State offences . . . .‖). 
124. Id. at 656. Today, of course, rights are still officially incorporated via the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s Due Process Clause, see, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), given that 
the Slaughter-House Cases severely limited the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See 83 U.S. 36 
(1872). 
125. Cooley, supra note 122, at 659. 
126. Id. at 660. For Cooley, the right to be free from religious establishments was so fundamental 
that he did not realize it was not recognized in every state constitution. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF 
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 469 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1868) (―These things 
which are not lawful under any of the American constitutions may be stated thus:—1. Any law 
respecting an establishment of religion.‖). It is notable that nonestablishment‘s status as a personal 
right was firmly ingrained in the mind of a knowledgeable commentator of the time. 
127. AMAR, supra note 115, at 387. 
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Amendment applied most Bill of Rights provisions against the states; it 
also furthered the popular perception that the Establishment Clause 
protected an individual right. Indeed, like many of his contemporaries, 
Justice Taney presented the Establishment Clause as an individual-rights 
provision rather than as a federalist provision, failing to distinguish 
between the Clause and other Bill of Rights provisions, such as the Free 
Exercise Clause. ―The powers of the government and the rights and 
privileges of the citizen,‖ Justice Taney wrote, ―are regulated and plainly 
defined by the Constitution itself . . . . [N]o one, we presume, will contend 
that Congress can make any law in a Territory respecting an establishment 
of religion, or the free exercise thereof . . . .‖128 
Of course, Dred Scott was not the only influence on citizens‘ 
understanding of the Amendment; public speeches and media coverage, 
too, shaped their expectations. The Amendment‘s author‘s interactions 
with the public demonstrate that many everyday citizens were acquainted 
with his interpretation of it. After all, when Bingham declared that ―we do 
not ally church and state,‖ he did so in a campaign speech in front of Ohio 
citizens that took place five months before the Ohio legislature voted to 
ratify the Amendment.129 His pamphlet, which declared his ―support [f]or 
the proposed amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights‖ on the title page 
itself—likewise sought to communicate the connection between the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights to the public.130 The press 
reinforced the linkage. In one instance, ―The New York Times summarized 
Bingham‘s amendment as ‗a proposition to arm the Congress . . . with the 
power to enforce the Bill of Rights.‘‖131 Such statements indicate that 
many citizens expected that the Amendment protected them from state 
religious establishments. Constitutional culture had indeed changed since 
the eighteenth century, when thousands of Americans lived under 
constitutions that mandated government support of religion. 
CONCLUSION 
Influenced by Balkin‘s emphasis on the inevitable interconnections 
between originalism and living constitutionalism, this Note aimed to 
reopen two important debates about the Establishment Clause. First, it 
sought to confirm a theory of constitutional change posited by several 
scholars—that freedom from establishment was considered an individual 
right by the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. And, second, it aimed 
to justify the incorporation of the Establishment Clause as announced in 
Everson. 
                                                          
128. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 16 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-50 (1856). 
129. See Aynes, supra note 118. 
130. See BINGHAM, supra note 117. 
131. AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 115, at 387. 
29
VanSant: From Opportunity to Right
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
VANSANT 3/28/2013 10:14 AM 
178 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 25:149 
I began by considering the establishment clauses in state constitutions, a 
heretofore neglected source, ultimately drawing several related 
conclusions. For one, the high percentage of constitutions that featured 
establishment clauses—a proportion that only grew as the century 
progressed—suggests that the majority of Americans lived with the 
expectation that they had a constitutional right to be free from 
government-imposed religious establishments. Second, the fact that nearly 
every state‘s establishment clause was located in the state‘s Declarations 
of Rights (or an equivalent section) indicates that freedom from 
establishment was an individual liberty; the syntax of the provisions—
which echoed that of other individual rights provisions—supports this 
understanding. The conflation of nonestablishment and the personal right 
of free exercise in state constitutions likewise corroborates this theory. 
Part II of the Note turned to state constitutional interpretation. Analysis 
of the opinions of states‘ highest courts revealed a change in constitutional 
and political culture: the emergence of a national standard in religious 
freedom that included nonestablishment principles. No longer was 
nonestablishment simply a matter of choice left to the states; instead, it 
was nothing short of an American value. Next, I concluded from state 
courts‘ opinions that freedom from establishment was considered a 
fundamental right of U.S. citizens in the years before the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. I then considered state courts‘ discussions of the 
liberty of conscience, determining that nonestablishment principles came 
to be inextricably connected with this individual right as the nineteenth 
century progressed. Finally, I examined the treatment of the Establishment 
Clause and nonestablishment in nineteenth-century legal treatises and in 
other genres of writing, determining that Americans outside the courtroom 
shared those views of religious freedom. 
Recognizing that freedom from establishment‘s status as a privilege of 
citizenship is not necessarily enough to justify the Establishment Clause‘s 
application against the states, Part IV addressed the Fourteenth 
Amendment in more detail. Building on and illuminated by the 
examination of changing views of the Establishment Clause, the final Part 
took an originalist approach, finding that freedom from establishment was 
on the minds of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s framers as they devised the 
Amendment, and of Americans as their legislatures contemplated 
ratification. Thus, in the end, regardless of contentions about the Clause‘s 
federalist origins, the outcome of Everson was the right one. And by 
reaching this originalist-friendly conclusion through an examination of 
changing constitutional culture both in the courts and beyond them, this 
Note applied in an historical context one of Balkin‘s key insights—that 
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132. Constitutional provisions that forbid the government from giving preference to one religious 
sect or that prevent the legislature from providing money for religion are considered ―Establishment 
Clause analogs‖ in this chart, provided that there are no accompanying provisions giving specific 
benefits to Christians. Because provisions (and their interpretations) vary, the presence of an 
Establishment Clause analog does not necessarily guarantee that the state government provided no 
support to religion whatsoever, nor does the absence of a provision mean that the state legislature 
chose to implement a religious establishment. The data, however, do indicate what citizens and 
lawmakers included among their constitutional rights. I selected 1860 as the second date as many 
Southern states experienced a sort of constitutional turmoil later in the decade, passing multiple 
constitutions in less than five years.  Moreover, during Reconstruction, the federal government 
oversaw the constitution-making process in Southern states. See Act To Provide for the More Efficient 
Government of the Rebel States, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
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Alabama - - 1819 *YES 
Arkansas - - 1836 *YES 
California - - 1849 *YES 
Connecticut 1776 NO 1818 NO 
Delaware 1776 YES 1831 YES 
Florida - - 1838 *YES 
Georgia 1789 NO 1798 YES 
Illinois - - 1848 *YES 
Indiana - - 1851 *YES 
Iowa - - 1857 *YES 
Kansas - - 1859 *YES 
Kentucky - - 1850 *YES 
Louisiana - - 1852 NO 
Maine - - 1820 *YES 
Maryland 1776 NO 1851 NO 
Massachusetts 1780 NO 1833 amend. *YES 
Michigan - - 1850 YES 
Minnesota - - 1857 *YES 
Mississippi - - 1832 *YES 
Missouri - - 1820 *YES 
New Hampshire 1784 NO 1792 NO 
New Jersey 1776 NO 1844 *YES 
New York 1777 YES 1846 YES 
North Carolina 1776 NO 1776 NO 
Ohio - - 1851 *YES 
Oregon - - 1857 *YES 
Pennsylvania 1790 NO 1838 *YES 
Rhode Island 1663 charter NO 1842 NO 
South Carolina 1790 YES 1790 YES 
Tennessee - - 1834 *YES 
Texas - - 1845 *YES 
Vermont 1786 NO 1793 NO 
Virginia 1776 NO 1850 NO 
Wisconsin - - 1848 *YES 
* Provision is included in the state Bill of Rights or the equivalent. 
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